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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The appellant-respondent will not make a long reply 
to Mr. Mullins1 petition for re-hearing. There has already 
been filed and considered by the Court almost one hundred 
pages of briefing, excluding the additional 25 pages in Mr. 
Mullins1 latest petition for re-hearing. 
However, this response is thought required to note 
certain inconsistencies and erroneous citations of the 
record and case law submitted by Mr. Mullins. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTION OF RESPONDENT-MULLINS, 
NO THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE WAS EVER PLEAD, PROVED, OR MADE 
AN ISSUE IN THIS PROCEEDING, BUT IS ASSERTED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME IN PETITIONER'S BRIEF FOR RE-HEARING. 
There exists no pleading and no facts to support 
the respondent-Mullins' new theory announced for the first 
time in its petition for re-hearing. On page 3 of his 
latest brief, respondent-Mullins asserts that Royal Indus-
tries should be held liable for "negligence" in failing to 
"... acquaint itself with the obligations of the selling 
corporation (the non-party Arizona corporation)." Petition 
for Re-Hearing, p.3. (Emphasis added). 
This Court has clearly and consistently held that 
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matters not plead and properly presented to the lower 
court cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. 
It has said: 
"Orderly procedure, whose principal 
purpose is the final settlement of contro-
versies, requires that a party must present 
is entire case and his theory or theories of 
recovery to the trial court; and having done 
so, he cannot change to some different theory 
and thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-
round of litigation." Simpson v. General 
Motors Corp., 24 Ut.2d. 301, 470 P.2d. 399, 
401 (1970); See also, Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Ut. 
2d. 366, 482 P. 2d. 702; Smith v. Deniro, 
28 Ut. 2d. 259, 501 P.2d. 265 (1972); Nickle v. 
Guarascio, 28 Ut. 2d. 425, 503 P.2d. 861 (1972). 
Certainly, such a meritorious rule is even more applicable 
when a litigant attempts such an allegation for the first 
time in a petition for re-hearing. 
However, even accepting arguendo that such a 
position can or should now be considered by the Court, the 
testimony was clear and unrebutted that Royal Industries 
did not have actual knowledge of these transactions between 
Mr. Mullins and the two non-party Arizona corporations. 
Rather, this particular matter was in the Arizona corporations1 
archives and they were not in fact inspected. (R-2; R-916, 
R-910-911, 918; A-278, 274-275, 280). Further, there was no 
evidence to suggest a sinister motive on the part of Royal 
Industries or anyone else as nakedly intimated by the 
petitioner. These were merely dead file records to which 
Royal, of course, had access, but which no one reasonably 
would examine. The only evidence on this point was by 
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Mr. Freedman who testified that Royal Industries retained 
an independent accounting firm to audit these Arizona 
companies and that in his expert C.P.A. opinion, all 
the examination was done in accordance with good business 
and accounting principles. (A-
It is also to be noted that this Court correctly 
stated in its decision that, by Mr. Mullins1 own ad-
mission, the agreement for a commission did not run into 
perpetuity. Rather, Mr. Mullins was to receive a 
commission only so long as the Arizona corporation 
manufactured the machines. He stated: 
"The agreement was that he would pay 
me two percent of the selling price of the 
machine, as long as he manufactured them." 
(Testimony of Walter Mullins, R-597; A-104-105; 
see also discussion thereof at page 49 and 50 
of defendants-appellants original brief). 
The Court was absolutely correct in its observation on 
page 3 of its decision that: 
"The right of Mr. Mullins to a commission 
was limited to machines made by the R. M. Evans 
Company, Inc. If the company made and sold no 
machines, then no commissions would be due Mr. 
Mullins, and he would have no basis for an action 
on his contracts against the R. M. Evans Company." 
Respondent-Mullins has filed in his petition for re-hearing 
as well as in his brief in the principal case, to address 
this underlying term of the agreement on which he based 
his claim. 
It is and was uncontested that the two Arizona 
corporations survived the sale of assets and assumption 
of certain liabilities by Royal Industries. Thus, the 
_ > i _ 
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opinion of the Court was absolutely correct in ruling 
as a matter of law that there was no obligation which 
could be and need be assumed by Royal Industries, Inc. 
POINT II 
THE BUY/SELL AGREEMENT OF ROYAL INDUSTRIES WAS 
NOT A "MERGER" AGREEMENT AND CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTION 
OF COUNSEL, BY ITS TERMS DID NOT ASSUME "ALL" OF THE 
LIABILITIES OF THE TWO ARIZONA CORPORATIONS. 
The touchstone of respondent-Mullins! petition 
for re-hearing is his desperate attempt to merge the 
two Arizona corporations, which are non-parties to this 
action, and Royal Industries. He does that by repeatedly 
calling the buy/sell agreement a "merger" agreement and 
substantially stretching the record; as a result, Mr. 
Mullins1 own petition is internally inconsistent. The 
Court's attention is drawn to page 9 of the Petition for 
Re-hearing, where Mr. Mullins states: 
"It is clear from the testimony of Mr. 
Freedman that Royal Industries intended to 
accept and thought they were getting all of 
the liabilities of the Evans companies (two 
Arizona corporations) except those enumerated 
specifically in the agreement as being reserved." 
(See page 9 and 10 of Mullins1 Petition for Re-
hearing) . 
Compare this unsupported statement with the actual language 
of the contract quoted on page 14 of the Petition for Re-
hearing. Here the actual language of the contract is 
quoted states that Royal was going to assume "... sub-
stantially all of the corporations1 (two Arizona cor-
porations) liabilities." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A further examination of that contract demon-
strates that those assumed liabilities were enumerated in 
detail and were included as a part of the purchase price. 
Likewise, the assets which were being acquired were enumer-
ated with specificity. In fact, the agreement on numerous 
occasions explicitedly stated in various ways the following: 
"Notwithstanding any other statement herein 
to the contrary, the assumption by Royal of the 
debts, liabilities and obligaions of the corpor-
ation (two non-party Arizona corporations) shall 
expressly exclude ... (5) any liabilities or 
obligations of the corporation of any nature, 
whether absolute, accrued, contingent or otherwise, 
... not reflected or reserved against on the balance 
sheet of the corporation as of August 31, 1968 ..." 
(See Exhibit 45 at pages 20 and 21) (Emphasis added). 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted: (1) Even if a negligence 
theory were supported by case law, petitioner cannot now 
raise it for the first time in this petition for re-hearing; 
(2) The Mullins commission agreement, by its own terms, 
expired before the sale of assets to Royal Industries; 
and (3) The Buy/Sell agreement of Royal Industries and the 
Arizona corporations expressly did not include the assertion 
by Royal of any claims, other than those enumerated and listed 
therein. The decision of this Court should not be disturbed. 
POINT III. 
THE CASE AUTHORITY CITED BY RESPONDENT-MULLINS 
IS INAPPLICABLE TO FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE. 
The respondent-Mullins has cited, at substantial 
length, an opinion from the Third Circuit called Knapp v. 
North Am.Rockwell Corp., (C.A. 3rd, 1974) 506 Fed.2d.361 
(19 74). However, that case did not involve a contract 
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assumption, much less a negligent assumption, issue; further, 
it did not involve any liability accruing by virtue of a 
commission agreement or any contract principles whatsoever. 
Rather, that case concerned the tort liability of one corpor-
ation which acquired the assets of another corporation, for 
injuries caused by defective products manufactured by 
the other corporation before the date of acquisition. This 
point was succinctly summarized by Circuit Judge Rosenn 
as follows: 
"The majority holds that, under certain 
circumstances, a corporation which acquires sub-
stantially all of the assets of another corpor-
ation may be held liable for injuries caused by 
defective products manufactured by the other 
corporation before the date of acquisition. In 
the instant case, they conclude that, even though 
the transaction was structured as a sale of assets, 
it should be 'treated as a 'merger1 for the 
purpose of imposing tort liability.'" Id at 
p. 370 (Emphasis added). 
Significantly, the rationale behind the decision was 
based upon the Federal Court Judgment as to what would be 
the applicable state law under the circumstances. In doing 
so, the Court was substantially influenced by what it con-
strued to be Pennsylvania public policy for imposing tort 
liability upon those individuals most able to spread the 
loss. In doing so, it reasoned from a Pennsylvania decision 
holding a governmental immunity statute invalid because 
such a ruling would spread personal injury loss to those 
most able to bear it. See Court discussion and rationale 
id at p. 369. 
In making its decision, the Court candidly admitted 
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it was basing its decision on this philosophical 
extention of Pennsylvania case law. It stated: 
"If we are to follow the philosophy of the 
Pennsylvania Courts that questions of an injured 
party's right to seek recovery are to be resolved 
by an analysis of public policy considerations 
rather than by a mere procrustean application 
of formalities, we must consider whether the 
TMW-Rockwell exchange was a merger, evaluate 
the public policy implication of that deter-
mination." Id at p. 369. 
The Court then noted: 
"As between these two parties, however, 
Rockwell is better able to spread the burden 
of the loss." 
Thereafter the Court observed that Rockwell could have 
protected itself by obtaining insurance and stated: 
"Rockwell could have protected itself from 
sustaining the brunt of the loss by securing from 
TMW an assignment of TMW's insurance. There is 
no indication in the record that such an assignment 
would have placed the burden on either Rockwell 
or TMW since TMW had already purchased the in-
surance protection, ..." Id at p. 370. 
The Court, therefore, held: 
"In the absence of contrary controlling 
decisions by the Pennsylvania Courts, we conclude 
that the State Judiciary would have adopted the 
rule of law that appears to better reason and 
more consistent with social policies set forth 
in recent Pennsylvania cases." Id at p. 370 
(Emphasis added). 
It is,therefore, clear that the decision was under-
pinned on the principle that when a corporation acquires 
the assets of another, tort liability should be assumed by 
the acquiring corporation because: 
(1) The acquiring corporation is better able to 
spread the loss of that injury, and 
(2) It could have easily protected itself by Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
acquiring the insurance maintained by the 
previous manufacturing organization. 
Those policy considerations are totally inapplicable to 
the instant case, which involves a commission contract 
for the payment of commissions for a limited time period. 
This Court in its decision correctly noted that 
the commission agreement by respondent-Mullins' own 
testimony was limited in time and duration. It was only 
to continue so long as the Arizona corporation made the 
machines. See discussion supra at p.4. As opposed to 
the case before the barf there was no tort injury, no 
insurance to be assigned, and no public policy consid-
erations of the nature enunciated in the Knapp decision. 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the 
authority cited is totally inapplicable to the facts of the 
case now before the bar. The question of merger was fully 
discussed and argued in the previous brief submitted to the 
Court. (See appellant's original brief at pp 15-22, 33-35; 
cf. appellant-Royal Industries, Inc. brief at pp 2 8-34). There 
are presented in this petition for re-hearing no new relevant 
authority or facts from those previously considered by the 
Court. Not only do the facts not justify the merger theory, 
but more importantly, such a theory is irrelevent to a 
contract which by its own terms was terminated and fulfilled. 
-9-
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CONCLUSION 
This Court properly disposed of the issues and 
rendered a correct decision. It is respectfully submitted 
that the matters now urged upon the Court by Petitioner 
are either irrelevant or issues already fully briefed, 
argued and correctly decided by the Court against the 
Petitioner. The previous decision of this Court should 
not be reconsidered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lynn G. Foster 
Roger F. Cutler, 
Attorneys for defendants-
appellants. ( 
{ 
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